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Abstract. Recent years have witnessed the diversifying means of competitive bidding, where the client plays a critical role 
in the determination of competition rule. It is widely recognized that the competition rule should be placed on a win-win 
basis to ensure that both the client and contractors are well considered with respect to their interests. Nevertheless, a vast 
majority of biddings fail to take account of what contractors really want. Using the methods of literature review and con-
tent analysis, 34 tender evaluation factors are proposed to compose the competition rule in China. Contractors’ opinions 
on these factors are collected by virtue of questionnaire survey. Based on the Pareto law, it is found that the competition 
rule encompasses eleven key factors, and the composition varies slightly between public and private sectors. The Hotelling’s 
T test is conducted on those key factors in common. The implication is that contractors can use indifferent factors (e.g., 
credit rating, construction plan, completeness of bid components, timely payment to workers) to improve competitiveness, 
while the client may utilize different factors to diversify the competition rule. This paper probably presents an earliest effort 
put to examine the acceptability of competition rule in the construction context.
Keywords: competition rule, competitive tendering, perception, project type, China.
Introduction
In the discipline of economics, competition refers to a ri-
valrous discovery process that takes place in parallel to 
organizational changes, innovation and evolution (Lit-
tlechild 2017). Effective competition enables production 
factors (e.g., capital, land, information, and human re-
sources) to be allocated across a range of sectors in line 
with the tenet of human welfare maximization (Smith 
1776), while inefficient competition may result in market 
failures. In the construction context, competition is en-
closed mainly by contractors in struggle for construction 
work contracts (Ye et al. 2015). This kind of competition 
has been unfolded in a few fashions such as average price, 
the lowest price, and multi-criteria bidding (Wong et al. 
2001). As pointed out by Christodoulou (2010), award-
ing construction contracts by virtue of the multi-criteria 
approach is an overriding style of effective competition 
in the construction industry. One of the reasons goes to 
its advantage of facilitating the client to screen out those 
contractors who are more competitive than counterparts 
in carrying out predefined construction assignments (Bot-
tani, Rizzi 2008).
The efficiency of markets in allocating resources is 
contingent on competition rules that should be accept-
able by a vast majority of both suppliers and demanders. 
However, the construction market has been a typical buyer 
market for a long time (Egemen, Mohamed 2005), where 
contractors as suppliers are given relatively feeble market 
powers. In case that the client offers an unreasonable price, 
contractors would take some countermeasures to secure 
a certain level of profitability in the subsequent construc-
tion process. For instance, they can choose to deliver con-
struction projects with quality levels lower than stipulated. 
Furthermore, market disorders such as collusion, cor-
ruption, and unqualified contracts would be surfacing if 
contractors’ competition against each other is irrational 
(Chotibhongs, Arditi 2012). In reverse, effective compe-
tition in the multi-criteria approach benefits contractors 
from fair business transaction and reaps profits as a con-
sequence (Egemen, Mohamed 2005; Oo et al. 2008). Since 
the ultimate purpose of the multi-criteria approach is to 
determine most competitive contractors, the client has the 
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responsibility of devising competition rules that represent 
contractors’ interests. 
In the multi-criteria approach, tender evaluation crite-
ria stay at the core of the competition rule (Liu et al. 2017). 
The client who runs the game as a referee reserves the right 
to amend tender evaluation criteria and requires tender-
ers to react to what they truly want as described in tender 
documents (Ng, Skitmore 1999; Fu et al. 2003). However, 
the key point is to secure the effectiveness and efficiency 
of tendering procedures, and to ascertain that any revision 
to tender evaluation criteria is acceptable to all parties in-
volved. In appreciating a dearth of relevant research in this 
area, this study aims to examine the competition rule in 
the construction sector by collecting contractors’ opinions 
on the multi-criteria approach. Due to the client’s prefer-
ence, project uniqueness, business environment, and lo-
cality of socio-economy (Newcombe 1990), the extent to 
which the multi-criteria approach is implemented varies 
from one project to another. In public projects, the tender 
evaluation has a number of boundaries and restrictions, 
including laws, regulations and procedures, but in private 
projects the tender evaluation process is more flexible, and 
more rational evaluation of criteria is usually adopted in 
the process (Kog, Yaman 2014). Contractors are not ad-
vised to use same competition strategies when they are 
competing for different types of construction projects si-
multaneously (Ye et al. 2014). Hence, competition rules for 
public and private construction projects are also examined 
in the study.
1. Literature review
1.1. Tender evaluation criteria
Tender evaluation criteria specify an overt way of busi-
ness competition in the construction industry, where the 
client usually finds it arduous to give a precise description 
of construction projects at the very beginning. Business 
competition in the construction industry is more complex 
than those in the manufacturing and service industries in 
a couple of ways. First, the client’s requirements on con-
tractors largely include quality, schedule, cost, safety, and 
green construction, but the requirements are changeable 
over time. Second, some construction works are charac-
terized with high technique, fragile surrounding environ-
ment and complexity of stakeholders. Contractors have 
to demonstrate that they have full capability to deal with 
any sort of challenges ahead. Third, what contractors com-
pete for in construction projects are not bidding prices, 
but also an opportunity of being recognized in the quality 
of services delivery. Therefore, contractors might attempt 
to exhibit previous experiences, give rigorous analysis on 
construction assignments, and delineate outstanding man-
agement skills in tenders.
Of tender evaluation criteria is a multidimensional 
competition rule that contractors can find connected to 
organizational competitiveness like technical competence, 
management expertise, marketing and financial resources 
(Liu et al. 2017). Watt et al. (2009) proposed nine param-
eters of tender evaluation criteria, namely organizational 
experience, project management expertise, tendered price, 
technical expertise, past project performance, reputation, 
method/solution, client-supplier relations, and workload/
capacity. According to Ho et al. (2010), the most popular 
criteria for the client to assess a contractor’s competitive-
ness are quality, price/cost, manufacturing capability, ser-
vice, management, technology, research and development, 
finance, and reputation. In effect, part of competitiveness 
parameters addressed in previous studies concur with 
each other, suggesting that notwithstanding diverse appli-
cations, the competition rules in the construction industry 
have some components in common. 
Lu et al. (2008) asserted that a contractor’s success fac-
tors vary distinctively with projects, implying that project 
type is an indicator for scrutinizing the client’s efforts in 
devising competition rules. Whilst construction projects 
can be categorized in different ways (e.g. civil infrastruc-
ture, building and other physical facilities), the term pro-
ject type mainly refer to public and private sector (Ng, 
Skitmore 1999; Ye et al. 2014). In general, tender evalua-
tion criteria for public and private projects are determined 
by the client in using them to mirror the uniqueness of 
construction projects and to ascertain the fluent operation 
of bidding in a dynamic circumstance characterized by the 
interplay of participants (Watt et al. 2010). To this end can 
contractor competitiveness be measured effectively (Yan 
2011; Wong et al. 2000), and the multi-criteria approach 
be operated smoothly for value of money (Drew, Skitmore 
1992; Liu et al. 2016).
1.2. A contractor perspective
In the domain of competitive bidding, decision that con-
tractors make comprises two stages, namely bid/not to 
bid and marginal sizes (Ye et al. 2014; Egemen, Mohamed 
2005). In these two stages, the client and contractors are 
often faced with a zero-sum game where each one’s gain 
or loss of utility is balanced by the other’s loss or gain of 
utility. A higher marginal-size decision made by contrac-
tors will reduce the total amount of interest available for 
the client. In contrast, non-zero-sum game elaborates a 
situation in which the interacting parties’ aggregate gains 
can be larger than zero-sum (Wright 2000). The client and 
contractors are not dual-antagonistic in the non-zero-sum 
game, and they can enlarge common interests by way of 
close cooperation. Both of them have same responsibil-
ity of creating values in the way towards non-zero-sum 
paradigms, rather than embarking on their own benefits 
without considering others.
As shown in Table 1, academic attention paid to the 
subject of competitive bidding has been increasing over 
the past decades. It is noted that previous studies are large-
ly concerned with multiple criteria, decision-making and 
competitiveness evaluation; most of them are addressed 
from the client’s perspective, but interests of contrac-
tors have rarely been interpreted. For examples, Oo et al. 
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(2008) compared contractors’ decision to bid in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. Hong Kong contractors are more in-
fluenced by market conditions in their decision to bid than 
Singaporean contractors, independent of the intensity of 
competition. Contractors from both cities tend to have 
less bidding decision when the number of competitors in 
the tender bidding increases. Biruk et al. (2017) examined 
contractors’ bidding decisions and identified key factors 
for contractors’ bidding decisions. Top five decision fac-
tors include: 1) Client’s financial standing; 2) Conditions 
of entering the bidding procedure; 3) Possibility of further 
cooperation with the client after the successful completion 
of project; 4) Experience/relationships with the project 
team (designer and client); 5) Project size and scope. To 
further investigate the rationales behind markup decision 
of the contractors for different types of projects, Ye et al. 
(2014) identified three main decision factors of markup: 
i) project nature; ii) client characteristic; and iii) market 
environment. Cheng et  al. (2011) integrated various ap-
proaches, including fuzzy preference relations, multi-cri-
teria prospect model and cumulative prospect theory to 
develop a bidding decision model and provide optimal 
markup scale advices to contractors. Despite these efforts, 
a couple of issues remains unsolved in the construction 
industry: 1) Does it mean that contractors have no need 
to participate in the formulation of competitive bidding?; 
2) How can contractors’ concerns be tightly embedded in 
the multi-criteria approach?
The participation of contractors in construction com-
petition is to win some contracts to undertake in the 
future. However, they might dislike those projects that 
the client poses very strict requirements on contractors 
with unreasonable schedules, unrealistic prices, and over-
whelming quality challenges. Once a large number of con-
tractors determine not to get involved in bidding, insuffi-
cient competition will arise, and the bidding process has to 
be relaunched. Consequently, the perception, attitudes and 
responses of contractors towards tender evaluation criteria 
deserve much consideration in the formulation of compe-
tition rules. 
1.3. Contractors’ perceptions on the competition 
rule
As discussed above, it is essential for contractors to evalu-
ate the extent to which the client’s requirements and ex-
pectation are absorbed in the formulation of competition 
rules. The perception of contractors on tender evaluation 
criteria is arguably determined by their experience, knowl-
edge, expertise, information, and preference. A small con-
tractor firm will find it easier than a large one to realize 
their perceptions in this sense and make relevant deci-
sions on bidding. Shash (1993) argued that the contrac-
tor could decide a markup size that increases the chance 
of achieving a dominating criterion of the competition. If 
the price factor occupies the competition rule, each bidder 
will attempt to offer a price that maximizes the probability 
of winning the tender and minimizes the differences be-
tween his/her bid and the bid prices of rival competitors. 
Kim and Reinschmidt (2011) argued that risk attitude is 
Table 1. A list of relevant studies on competitive tendering
No Reference
Perspective Keywords
Client Contractor Criteria Competition Decision Evaluation
1 Hatush and Skitmore (1997) * * *
2 Hatush and Skitmore (1998) * *
3 Egemen and Mohamed (2005) * * *
4 Oo et al. (2008) * *
5 Arslan et al. (2008) * *
6 Watt et al. (2009) * * *
7 Watt et al. (2010) * * *
8 Cheng et al. (2011) 　 * * *
9 Liu et al. (2013) * * *
10 Ye et al. (2014) * * *
11 Zhang et al. (2015) * *
12 Liu et al. (2016) * * * *
13 Yang et al. (2016) * * *
14 Liu et al. (2017) * * *
15 Biruk et al. (2017) * *
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a significant factor determining competitive characteristic 
of contractors. A moderate risk aversion is associated with 
higher survival rates, higher profitability, and firm growth. 
Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2016) found that the traditional 
lowest bid method promotes bidding aggressiveness of 
bidders and, all the negative outcomes associated with ag-
gressive bidding. Factors, including bid score weighting, 
bid scoring formula, and abnormally low bids criterion 
are considered significant in affecting behavior of bidders, 
e.g. aggressive/conservative bidding and concentration/
dispersion of bids. As shown in Table 2, two types of pro-
jects – public and private are compared in a few manners, 
offering a useful angle to view how contractors perceive 
the competition rule in their own right. Therefore, pro-
ject attributes are assumed to influence the perception of 
contractors on the competition rule (i.e. tender evaluation 
criteria). 
The seventeen (17) attributes listed in Table  2 are 
grouped into four stages (see Figure 1) in light of their in-
herent connections, namely: 1) briefing; 2) bidding; 3) im-
plementation; and 4) post-project review. The briefing 
stage refers to those activities related to project inception 
and construction plans. The bidding stage describes the 
interaction between the client and contractors to reach a 
contract. The implementation stage means the construc-
tion process conducted as said in construction plans. The 
post-project review serves to evaluate the construction 
process after the project is put into use. The classification 
of attributes into these four stages was conducted by firstly 
reviewing the nature, characteristics and the relationship 
in various project stages of these 17 factors discussed and 
identified in previous literature (Newcombe 1990; Holt 
et  al. 1995; Drew, Skitmore 1992, 1997; Fu et  al. 2003; 
Hwang et al. 2011; Ye et al. 2014). To ensure the suitability 
of the attribute classification, it was cross-checked by the 
industry practitioners and academics.
The competition rule stipulated in tender documents 
may be given a certain level of importance by either pub-
lic or private clients along the four stages. Currently, the 
approach of integrated project delivery has gained much 
Table 2. Difference between public and private projects in attributes
No. Attributes Public projects (PUs) Private projects (PIs) References
A1 Accountability Highly required Neutral Drew and Skitmore (1997) Holt et al. (1995)
A2 Application of lowest price Less frequent Frequent Drew and Skitmore (1992)
A3 Bidding methods Competitive Selective /competitive Drew and Skitmore (1992) 
A4 Business environment Complicated Less Newcombe (1990)
A5 Competitive environment Broad Narrow Newcombe (1990)
A6 Construction risks More Less Newcombe (1990)
A7 Cost control Neutral Highly required Hwang et al. (2011)
A8 Design and specification Detailed Simplified Drew and Skitmore (1992)
A9 Diversity of works Higher Lower Drew and Skitmore (1992)
A10 Influence to the society More Less Ye et al. (2014)
A11 Motivation For social welfare For profits Hwang et al. (2011)
A12 Profitability Expected Highly expected Holt et al. (1995)
A13 Project characteristics Complicated Simplified Ye et al. (2014)
A14 Requirements of the client Higher Median Fu et al. (2003)
A15 Schedule control Neutral Highly required Hwang et al. (2011)
A16 Social concern Higher Lower Ye et al. (2014)
A17 Tendering procedure in comparison Inflexible Flexible Drew and Skitmore (1997) 
Figure 1. Four stages of determinant factors
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popularity as an efficient assembly of production factors 
(i.e., people, technology, information and capitals) in the 
construction process (Mesa et  al. 2016). An aggregating 
application of this delivery approach necessitates contrac-
tors to develop an ability of providing holistic services to 
the client, and both the client and contractors ought to 
work together in the whole process (Mesa et  al. 2016). 
Therefore, it is vital that the competition rule is built on all 
of the four stages.
2. Methodology
A mixture of research methods was adopted in this study 
to serve the aforementioned research purpose. First, an 
extensive literature review and content analysis on used 
tender documents gave rise to the identification of 34 
evaluation factors. Second, a questionnaire survey was 
conducted to collect professionals’ opinions on the im-
portance of these factors. Third, data were collected and 
analyzed to detect the key factors and their differences 
between public and private projects. 
2.1. Identifying tender evaluation factors
Typical databases including Web of Science, Engineering 
Village, Emerald, and ASCE Library were scanned careful-
ly to identify academic publications on the multi-criteria 
approach. The technique of content analysis was adopted 
to extract tender evaluation factors (EFs) outlined in pre-
vious studies. The content analysis process started with the 
analysis and coding of information from sources above-
mentioned jointly by the authors and research assistants. 
Participants were trained and given ten randomly selected 
and identical items and made an initial analysis in an in-
dependent way. Participants’ judgments were compared, 
and disagreements were discussed until agreements were 
reached. Inter-coder reliability was 97% of all the items 
coded, which is considered acceptable (Kassarjian 1977). 
The coders subsequently analysed the rest of items, coding 
a total of fifteen data items. Participants were then invited 
to re-analyse 5% of the items and the test-retest agree-
ments are 99%. At the end, a total of 27 EFs were framed. 
For simplicity, only the results are shown in Table 3. 
The national government of China has enforced a tem-
plate for the client to compile tender documents for a long 
time. The template can be transformed into any type of 
tender documents to satisfy various needs. On the basis 
of the template, the client is able to state clearly project 
profiles, tendering procedures, qualification of tenderers, 
components of tenders, project delivery goals, risk shar-
ing, and schedule for tendering. Therefore, tender docu-
ments are a proxy for observing the client’s efforts in the 
formulation of competition rule. In this study, 217 tender 
documents covering a wide range of construction projects 
(i.e., housing, infrastructure, renewal public projects) were 
gathered. All of the tender documents are built on the 
multi-criteria approach. The technique of content analy-
sis was used again to extract those factors that have been 
considered in tender evaluation criteria. Steps of content 
analysis process as described above were conducted twice 
by the research team to avoid subjectivity and information 
omission. The rule for inclusion is that a factor should be 
included if it appears in more than two tender documents. 
The frequency per EF in the 217 tender documents is given 
in Table 3. 
2.2. Questionnaire survey
Evaluating relative importance is an effective way to iden-
tify key factors from a number of alternatives (Ye et  al. 
2014). A five-point Likert scale (5 – extremely important, 
4 – important, 3 – neutral, 2 – unimportant, 1 – extreme-
ly unimportant) is often adopted to gather respondents’ 
opinions. In this study, 34 factors were converted into a 
questionnaire with three sections. The first section de-
scribes the objectives and scope of the survey. In the sec-
ond section, respondents are requested to provide demo-
graphic information regarding types and qualifications of 
enterprises, education background and working years. The 
other part of the questionnaire is a scale for respondents 
to mark importance levels on all factors. In this section, 
all factors are tabulated with two columns (public projects 
and private projects), and respondents are reminded to fill 
in both columns per factor. 
500 copies of questionnaire were sent out via post or 
e-mail. To ascertain a good response rate, respondents were 
contacted by phone as far as the research team was able to. 
A total of 275 questionnaires were finally returned, giving a 
response rate of 55%. However, 68 copies of questionnaires 
were found inadequate due to incomplete answering. The 
respondents distribute widely on working years: 0–2 years 
(9.63%), 3–5 years (25.67%), 6–10 years (32.62%), 11–15 
years (16.58%), and over 16 years (15.51%). Most of them 
(68.61%) indicated good knowledge of the subject. The re-
spondents were from major cities of China, namely Beijing 
(8.02%), Shanghai (7.49%), Guangzhou (10.16%), Chengdu 
(13.90%), Chongqing (12.83%), Hangzhou (8.56%), and 
Nanjing (8.02%). They were general contractors (69.52%), 
subcontractors (11.23%), tendering agents (3.21%), and oth-
ers (16.04%). Of all the respondents, 18.5% are high-level 
enterprise managers, 36.3% are project managers, and 45.2% 
are commercial managers in charge of bidding activities.
2.3. Data analysis
Mean values (MVs) per evaluation factor (EF) were cal-
culated in both two columns – public and private, and the 
results are then used to rank all the factors in a descend-
ing order of importance. According to the definition of 
the five-point Likert scale, those items with an importance 
level of MV higher than 3.0 can be included. In consider-
ing that this step cannot derive crucial items, the Pareto 
law was adopted further to extract key evaluation factors 
(Chen et al. 1994). According to the Pareto law, 20 per-
cent of factors contribute to 80 percent of all factors in 
importance. As a rule of thumb, the range of MVs of all 
the important EFs is (V2, V1), and V1 > V2 > 3.0. The larger 
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the MV, the more important the EF; and the MVs of key 
EFs fall in an interval between χ to V1 (V1 ≥ MV ≥ χ). The 
equation for calculation is described below:
1
1 2
100% 20%
V
V V
−χ
× =
−
, (1)
where V1 represents the highest mean value; V2 represents 
a mean value larger than 3.0, and χ represents the lowest 
mean values. 
There might be some key evaluation factors in com-
mon for both public and private projects. It is important to 
explore whether these factors have same roles in the com-
petition rules. Therefore, on the basis of the key factors, 
the Hotelling’s T (HT) test was conducted to detect all of 
the common key EFs between PUs and PIs. The distribu-
tion of HT is a generalization of Student’s t distribution 
used to evaluate the statistical significance of the difference 
between samples’ means (Ye et al. 2014). HT test applies 
Table 3. A preliminary list of tender evaluation factors
No. Evaluation Factors (EFs) Sources Frequency
EF1 Bid price Hatush and Skitmore (1998)Watt et al. (2009) 217
EF2 Bid quality Watt et al. (2009) 21
EF3 Bidders’ honors and awards Watt et al. (2009) 50
EF4 Bidders’ performance in the past Ng and Skitmore (1999) 111
EF5 Bidders’ additional offers / 6
EF6 Competence of the project manager to be appointed Watt et al. (2009) 73
EF7 Competitiveness of bidders Ng and Skitmore (1999) 73
EF8 Completeness of bid components / 16
EF9 Comprehension of project management team on tender documents / 24
EF10 Construction plan Watt et al. (2009) 96
EF11 Construction site layout Watt et al. (2009) 108
EF12 Construction technical measures Ng and Skitmore (1999) 156
EF13 Credit rating of bidders Ng and Skitmore (1999) 74
EF14 Dealing with unanticipated problems (caused by weather) Wong et al. (2001) 27
EF15 Degree of innovation Tang et al. (2003) 30
EF16 Health, safety and environmental measures Watt et al. (2009) 167
EF17 Manpower, plant and equipment capacity Watt et al. (2009) 158
EF18 Onsite energy-saving measures / 26
EF19 Organizational experience and skills Hatush and Skitmore (1997) Watt et al. (2009) 134
EF20 Overhead fee Hatush and Skitmore (1997) 21
EF21 Past relationship with other entities Nieto-Morote, Ruz-Vila (2012) 16
EF22 Proposed schedule Lambropoulos (2013) 15
EF23 Protection for completed construction works / 15
EF24 Quality assurance and control Ng and Skitmore (1999) 175
EF25 Quality of construction samples / 6
EF26 Reasonableness of bid and its components Wong et al. (2001) 22
EF27 Recommendations on the improvement of project management / 20
EF28 Response to instruction for bidders Ng and Skitmore (1999)Watt et al. (2009) 50
EF29 Schedule assurance and control Watt et al. (2009) 180
EF30 Subcontracting management Ng and Skitmore (1999) 29
EF31 Technical solution to key issues Liu et al. (2016) 53
EF32 Timely payment to workers Arslan et al. (2008) 3
EF33 Unit price of bid Wong et al. (2001) 25
EF34 Warranty offered Lambropoulos (2013) 52
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to multivariate statistics, indicating the difference between 
multivariate means of different samples, which contains 
one sample t test, paired t test, and two samples t test. Two 
tests were conducted namely independent samples t test to 
reflect the normality and homogeneity of variances, and 
multivariate paired t test to image the difference per EF 
between public projects (PUs) and private projects (PIs) 
in importance. 
Three preconditions shall be satisfied if HT test is to be 
adopted. First, data for analysis are consecutive. Second, 
data match the normal distribution. Third, sample vari-
ances must be homogeneous. Therefore, data conversion, 
normality test and homogeneity test of variances were 
conducted accordingly. The purpose of conducting reli-
ability test is to look at whether respondents’ answers to 
the 187 questionnaires are consistent with each other. As 
calculated, the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients for PUs and 
PIs are 0.950 and 0.959, suggesting that both have a satis-
factory level of reliability.
Respondents’ judgments on a factor were grouped into 
paired samples: Group 1 – PU, Group 2 – PI. The returned 
questionnaires were classified into 19 groups according to 
the city that respondents belong to. Mean value per EF per 
group was computed using the following equation. There-
by, the mean values derived follow a continuous distribu-
tion on the range (1, 5) can be confirmed: 
n
m 1 ;  1,  2;  1,2, ,  ijijk
x
x i j
n
== = = …
∑ 34, (2)
where, x  refers to the score of importance level for a fac-
tor:
i = 1 or 2, represents public projects and private project 
respectively;
j = 1, 2, 3, …, 34, refers to the number of a key factor in 
ranking, as shown in Table 3;
k = 1, 2, 3, …, 19, represents the number of a city in 
ranking;
n means the total amount of samples from a certain 
city group.
Data conversed as described above were restructured 
into two matrixes (34×19) – PUs and PIs. Each EF has 19 
mean values to test whether the mean values obey the nor-
mal distribution. The test is built on Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(K-S) coefficients of 68 samples. If P-value of the sample is 
larger than 0.05, the data can satisfy the normal distribu-
tion. Furthermore, the Levene test of variance equations 
was detected to measure the variances between X1j and 
X2j. The structured mean values state whether this EF has 
significantly indifferent variances. If P-value of Levene test 
for X1j and X2j is larger than 0.05, the EF has significantly 
indifferent variances between the two groups. 
3. Results
Mean values for all EFs are listed in Table 4 and they are 
ranked in a descending importance-based order. χ was 
calculated using equation 1. As a result, 4.284 ≥ MV ≥ 
3.222 for public projects, and MVs of the key EFs range 
from 4.072 to 4.284; 4.259 ≥ MV ≥ 3.062 for private pro-
jects, and MVs of the key EF range from 4.020 to 4.259. 
The results suggest that both public and private projects 
have eleven key factors, and there are nine items in com-
mon as indicated in Table 4. 
In the step of HT test, P-values of K-S coefficients for 
X1j range from 0.168 to 0.988, and the same values for X2j 
range from 0.195 to 0.999. All of the K-S coefficients are 
larger than 0.05, indicating that both X1j and X2j obey nor-
mal distribution. P-values of Levene test for either X1j or 
X2j range span from 0.079 to 0.996. All are larger than 0.05, 
suggesting that each has significantly indifferent variance 
between PUs and PIs. Hence, the data collected for the 
nine key factors are qualified to conduct the multivariate 
paired HT test. 
The multivariate paired HT test is decomposed of two 
steps, namely the paired samples correlation coefficient r 
and the paired samples HT test P-values. If 0.5 ≤ |r| <0.8, 
the two variables compared are moderately correlative. In 
this study, 82.35% absolute values of the paired samples 
correlation coefficients are larger than 0.5 with a signifi-
cance level lower than 0.05, suggesting that these variables 
are significantly correlative. If P-value of the paired sam-
ples is smaller than 0.05, this factor plays different roles in 
the competition rules between public and private projects. 
In reverse, if P-value is larger than 0.05, the role is same. In 
this study, the results of the paired samples HT test (r, sig., 
P) are as follows: EF10 (0.754, 0, 0.025), EF13 (0.728, 0, 
0.008), EF22 (0.891, 0, 0.035), EF26 (0.789, 0, 0.034), EF32 
(0.834, 0, 0.038), EF12 (0.407, 0.084, 0.643), EF24 (0.829, 
0, 0.218), EF33 (0.644, 0.003, 0.373), and EF34 (0.569, 
0.011, 0.253). 
4. Findings and discussion
4.1. A new perspective on the competition rule
As listed in Table 4, the common key evaluation factors 
(EFs) for both public and private projects are found to 
contain EF10 (Construction plan), EF12 (Construction 
technical measures), EF13 (Credit rating of bidders), EF22 
(Proposed schedule), EF24 (Quality assurance and con-
trol), EF26 (Reasonableness of bid and its components), 
EF32 (Timely payment to workers), EF33 (Unit price of 
bid), and EF34 (Warranty offered). In addition, two EFs 
are appreciated valuable for public projects (EF7, Com-
petitiveness of bidders; EF8, Completeness of bid compo-
nents), and two for private projects (EF1, Bid price; EF29, 
Schedule assurance and control). The detection of these 
key factors outlines a pattern that contractors employ to 
view the competition rule, and the pattern vary slightly 
between public and private sectors. Therefore, this study 
contributes to the body of knowledge by addressing a 
new perspective on competitive bidding in the discipline 
of construction economics and management (Wong et al. 
2001; Ye et  al. 2014). The implication is that although 
competitive bidding is dominated by the client, contrac-
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tors’ awareness, thoughts, and attitudes are associated with 
the efficiency of the competition rule. The gap between the 
client and contractors exists in the construction industry, 
suggesting that more efforts should be made to improve 
current competitive bidding practices in order to yield 
win-win effects to both the client and contractors. 
The whole construction process is divided into four 
stages, namely briefing, bidding, implementation, and 
post-project review (see Figure 1) with reference to con-
struction project attributes. In order to explore the opin-
ions of contractors on the competition rule, all of the key 
factors are scattered over these four stages (as indicated in 
Figure 2) according to the nature, characteristics and the 
effect on various project stages. As shown in Figure 2, most 
of the key factors are stuck in the stage of bidding (EF13, 
EF26, EF33) and implementation (EF10, EF12, EF24, 
EF22, and EF32), while there is only one EF for the post-
project review stage (EF34). It is thus found that the attrib-
utes of construction projects have not been fully absorbed 
in the formulation of competition rules. Whilst contrac-
tors are advocated to develop all-round perceptions on the 
competition rule, the gap of tender evaluation criteria be-
tween the client and contractors must be filled in. Thereby, 
the cooperation between the client and contractors will be 
more fruitful in delivering construction projects.
4.2. Using indifferent factors to fortify contractor 
competitiveness
The results suggest that four key factors, namely EF12 
(Construction technical measures), EF24 (Quality assur-
ance and control), EF33 (Unit price of bid), and EF34 
Table 4. A MV based list of factors in descending order
Public Projects (PUs) Private Projects (PIs)
EF MV EF MV EF MV EF MV
EF13** 4.284 EF6 3.983 EF22** 4.259 EF16 3.905 
EF7 4.277 EF2 3.915 EF33** 4.182 EF11 3.893 
EF32** 4.257 EF4 3.907 EF1 4.151 EF18 3.859 
EF33** 4.248 EF27 3.902 EF12** 4.125 EF30 3.842 
EF10** 4.207 EF30 3.888 EF29 4.121 EF19 3.829 
EF24** 4.201 EF17 3.863 EF24** 4.118 EF27 3.820 
EF12** 4.175 EF20 3.857 EF32** 4.106 EF21 3.803 
EF26** 4.162 EF21 3.850 EF34** 4.069 EF14 3.792 
EF34** 4.156 EF11 3.849 EF10** 4.047 EF20 3.791 
EF8 4.125 EF18 3.840 EF13** 4.040 EF2 3.784 
EF22** 4.122 EF25 3.832 EF26** 4.030 EF23 3.769 
EF19 4.053 EF23 3.811 EF28 4.004 EF4 3.754 
EF29 4.045 EF15 3.762 EF31 4.001 EF25 3.753 
EF31 4.041 EF14 3.725 EF17 3.997 EF15 3.569 
EF1 4.033 EF9 3.566 EF8 3.966 EF5 3.552 
EF16 4.022 EF3 3.251 EF6 3.927 EF9 3.523 
EF28 3.991 EF5 3.222 EF7 3.911 EF3 3.062 
Note: those items underlined mean that they are crucial to both public and private projects. ** represents the common key factor for both 
public (PUs) and private (PIs) projects.
Figure 2. Distribution of key factors along the construction process
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(Warranty offered) have indifferent roles in the competi-
tion rules for both public and private projects. These fac-
tors are discussed here with an aim of elaborating their 
meanings and implications to practitioners. Contractors 
have to adopt flexible response strategies and optimize 
the portfolio of resources to maintain competitiveness 
in various competition situations. However, not all con-
tractors are able to achieve this. In view of the relatively 
unchanged roles, contractors are recommended to input 
more resources into these four factors to fortify competi-
tiveness in the long run. 
Unit price of bid (EF33): This factor spells out the im-
portance that contractors attach to economic interest in 
the competition rule for both public and private projects. 
Competitive bidding enables the client to reach either 
lump-sum or unit-price agreements with contractors prior 
to signing construction contracts. In this step, bid prices 
and unit prices are main issues to be negotiated between 
the client and contractors. To gain more advantages over 
price competition, contractors must examine tender docu-
ments carefully, to give an accurate estimation of bidding 
prices, and to compile tenders in due ways. Since tender 
evaluation is time-consuming, the client usually spends 
much time collecting information about unit price of bid 
to lay a foundation for comparing bidders’ prices. A nego-
tiation on unit price of bid is to allocate risks reasonably 
between project participants. The lower is the bid price, 
the higher the competitiveness. Therefore, economic inter-
est prevails in both public and private construction pro-
jects in a similar way.
Construction technical measures (EF12), Quality as-
surance and control (EF24): The identification of these 
two factors highlights the vital role of construction qual-
ity and its realization that contractors have to accomplish 
on construction sites. In the implementation stage, con-
struction ideas are transformed into physical facilities, and 
construction activities are subject to technical uncertain-
ties and risks especially in infrastructure projects such as 
tunnels, dams, and bridges. It is highlighted that 29% of 
construction project accidents in Germany are directly 
caused by quality problems. Similarly, China had 442 cases 
of construction quality and safety production accidents in 
2015, in which 554 people died. Construction technical 
measures serve to solve problems and difficulties and im-
prove production efficiency; quality assurance and control 
is intended to guarantee that project achievement matches 
the client’s requirements. Therefore, previous studies have 
pointed out that competence in technology and manage-
ment abilities are two key indicators for the client to evalu-
ate a contractor’s competitiveness (Liu et al. 2016). Mean-
while, contractors have many choices of demonstrating 
their technical capability via track record, proposing good 
construction technical measures, providing quality assur-
ance + control, and offering construction organization de-
signs (Ng, Skitmore 1999; Liu et al. 2016). 
Warranty offered (EF34): Inappropriateness and prob-
lems with completed construction projects have been 
aware industrywide in China, which necessities the crea-
tion of warranty services as a solution. In effect, techni-
cal complexity of construction projects inspires the client 
to include the strength of contractors in supplying war-
ranty services in the competition rule. For instance, war-
ranty provision has been a part of US construction con-
tracts to benefit the client from increasing the quality of 
built facilities (Lambropoulos 2013; Bayraktar et al. 2004). 
In China, the warranty period normally lasts two or three 
years. The inclusion of this factor in the competition rule 
is also originated from the fact that sustainability and life-
cycle management paradigms are elaborated at the outset 
of construction projects and gradually incorporated into 
the construction process (Labuschagne, Brent 2005). The 
post-project warranty provided by contractors can im-
prove the satisfaction of both the client and end-users, and 
it could be a valuable way to build trust between the client 
and contractors. Figure  3 summarised these four above-
mentioned common factors and their related stages in 
light of their inherent connects.
4.3. Utilizing different factors to diversify the 
competition rule
The results of data analysis signify contributions of five 
factors to the competition rule in different ways, namely 
EF10 (Construction plan), EF13 (Credit rating of bid-
ders), EF22 (Proposed schedule), EF26 (Reasonableness 
of bid and its components), and EF32 (Timely payment 
to workers). These factors are concerned with bidding 
(EF13, EF26) and implementation (EF10, EF22, EF32) 
of construction activities, and can explain the reality that 
finding an unchanged competition rule for all kinds of 
projects is unrealistic. These factors are discussed herein 
by referring to the project attributes shown in Figure 4. 
Credit rating of bidders (EF13), Reasonableness of bid 
and its components (EF26): Credit and reputation are uti-
lized to gauge contractors’ future performance based on 
an analogy from their track record in the past. As a key 
competitiveness factor, credit reflects the achievements of 
organizations as a result of corporate governance structure 
Figure 3. Common key factors of the competition rule
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(Bereskin et al. 2015). Contractors with higher credits are 
more able to receive supports from financers (Bereskin 
et al. 2015). The different role that this factor plays in the 
competition rule between public and private projects can 
be ascribed to project attributes. Table 2 shows that public 
projects are enclosed by a more intricate business environ-
ment (A4), competitive environment (A5), higher require-
ments of the client (A14), and huger investment demand 
than private projects. For transparency, information about 
the credit of contractors is often compiled to aid govern-
ments in evaluating the quantification of contractors. 
In the exercise of tender evaluation, bids are examined 
carefully and benchmarked if needed (Watt et  al. 2010). 
This study found that the client’s efforts revolve round 
bid prices, reasonableness of bids and its components. 
Bid price is one of the primary competitiveness indica-
tors (Zhang et  al. 2015; Liu et  al. 2016); the reasonable-
ness of bid and its components images contractors’ robust 
consideration on the construction works they are to bid 
for. Drew and Skitmore (1997) pointed out that tender-
ing procedures for public projects are often standardized 
by governments at various levels, and its implementation 
is under strict supervision. Due to inherent governance, 
public projects are regulated with more inflexible tender-
ing procedure (A17), more competitive bidding methods 
(A3) and less application of lowest price criteria (A2). It 
is implied that the client of public projects should guide 
contractors to examine the list item carefully and offer rea-
sonable bid prices.
Construction plan (EF10), Proposed schedule (EF22), 
Timely payment to workers (EF32): Construction plan 
functions as a roadmap for contractors to undertake con-
struction works. Its importance as revealed in this study 
drives the client to elaborte it in tender documents. In 
practice, contractors have many opportunities to handle 
construction challenges such as tighter schedule, higher 
requirements on sustainable construction and social re-
sponsibility on construction sites. A good construction 
plan proposed in tenders demonstrates contractors’ effort 
to strike the tradeoff between cost, time and quality. Pub-
lic projects in nature are characterized by higher account-
ability (A1), vulnerability to societal impact (A16), project 
complexity in technologies (A13), and construction risks 
exposure (A6). Therefore, the client in the public sector 
has to examine whether construction plans are formulated 
in due manners.
One of the responsibilities of contractors is to complete 
construction works within a defined timeframe (Wu et al. 
2010). More resources are consumed and construction 
quality might be impacted if a construction project falls 
behind the schedule. As revealed in the study, part of the 
competition rule is thus built on the factor of proposed 
schedule (EF22), which means that contractors need to ex-
press strong determination to deliver construction projects 
timely. Furthermore, it is found that strategies to manage 
this factor should not be same between in the public sector 
and in the private one. The reason has been offered in the 
literature. As presented in previous studies, the priority of 
project management triangle in public projects is quality > 
cost > time, but it is time > quality > cost in private projects 
(Holt et al. 1995). It seems that the public client cares more 
about construction quality control, while the private client 
stresses schedule control (A15) (Hwang et al. 2011). 
The contribution of construction workers to economic 
prosperity has never faded over the past decades. Howev-
er, construction workers are vulnerable and in shortage of 
adequate education and training (Torres et al. 2013). Sal-
ary payment to construction workers might be misleading, 
and it can develop into some kinds of social problems. If 
this happens, the client and contractors may be fined heav-
ily. Therefore, it is necessary to embed this factor “timely 
payment to workers” (EF32) in the competition rule and 
requires contractors to compete with good offers. By com-
parison, the public sector has more far-reaching influence 
to society (A16), and they have more obligations to ensure 
that timely payment to laborers has been made efficiently. 
Conclusions
In the construction market, business is transacted between 
the client and contractors. The mechanism of construc-
tion business transaction is mostly by virtue of the multi-
criteria approach, of which tender evaluation criteria con-
stitute the competition rule. In practice, the complexity 
of construction projects usually confronts the client with 
difficulty in devising a competition rule acceptable to con-
tractors. This study highlights a new perspective on the 
competition rule by examining what contractors really 
want and how to improve the competition rule if their 
opinions are raised. It is found that the crucial part of ten-
der evaluation criteria for both public and private projects 
is similarly composed of eleven key factors respectively. 
Among the factors, nine items are overlapped, namely 
credit rating of bidders, reasonableness of bid and its com-
ponents, construction plan, timely payment to workers, 
proposed schedule, unit price of bid, construction techni-
cal measures, quality assurance and control, and warranty 
offered. Furthermore, part of the overlapped factors in the 
Figure 4. Different factors of the competition rule
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competition rule differ from each other between public 
and private projects. The difference can be ascribed to 
the attributes of project types. The implications are that 
contractors may consider using those common factors to 
improve competitiveness, and the client utilizes different 
factors to diversify the competition rule. Thereby, effective 
competition can be actualized in the implementation of 
the multi-criteria approach. 
Despite these achievements, this study was limited by 
its designed boundaries. Firstly, although the 207 valid re-
sponses and the 55 per cent response rate are considered 
reasonable when compared with previous studies, this 
study presented an earliest effort to investigate the percep-
tions of competition rule in the construction industry. To 
generalize the findings, a larger sample size with contrac-
tors of different backgrounds (e.g. ENR contractors, state-/
government-owned contractors, private contractors, from 
more cities in China) would be expected in any further 
study. Secondly, while this study provides a preliminary 
insight into the competition rule for public and private 
projects, but it does not provide any findings on how con-
tractors reacts to competition rules in different project/
procurement types. Future studies should be extended to 
not only investigating based on a larger sample size but 
also to examining the acceptability of competition rules 
under different project types and procurement methods in 
China or any other regions.
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